They have no idea… decision-making and policy change in the global financial crisis by Jones, Erik
       
 
LSE ‘Europe in Question’ Discussion Paper Series 
 
They Have No Idea . . . 
Decision-making and Policy Change in  






































All views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the 
views of the editors or the LSE. 
© Erik Jones 
Editorial Board 
Dr. Joan Costa-i-Font 
Dr. Vassilis Monastiriotis 
Dr. Jonathan White 
Ms. Katjana Gattermann 
 
Erik Jones 
   
They Have No Idea . . . 
Decision-making and Policy Change in 
the Global Financial Crisis 
Erik Jones* 
 
Crisis: . . . 3. A vitally important or decisive stage in the progress of anything; a 
turning point; also, a state of affairs in which a decisive change for better or worse 
is imminent; now applied esp. in times of difficulty, insecurity, and suspense in 
politics or commerce. 
 Oxford English Dictionary (1971: 1178) 
 
Is the identification of a situation as one of crisis an objective, analytical, or even 
empirical claim or does it necessarily imply a subjective and hence normative 
judgement? Should we define crisis in terms of objective factors such as the ‘weight’ 
of contradictions within a given system or in more subjective terms such as the 
perception of the need for rapid and decisive intervention in the context of widely 
experienced political and economic contradiction? 
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They Have No Idea . . . 
Decision-making and Policy Change in 
the Global Financial Crisis 
 
1. Introduction 
The cluster of economic problems that emerged from and surrounded the growing 
defaults in United States sub-prime and Alt-A mortgage lending markets is widely 
regarded as a ‘crisis’. Some have even gone so far as to say that this is the worst 
economic crisis since the 1930s. But is it a crisis because in some real-world sense it 
threatens to take down the global financial system, or is it a crisis because 
policymakers in the United States and elsewhere finally decided it is time to make a 
‘decisive intervention’ in the markets? 
The distinction here is important. If we side with the real-world interpretation, then 
the timing of events is exogenous and the policy response is endogenous. 
Policymakers really have to do something to stop the situation from getting out of 
hand or else all hell will break loose. If we come down on the ‘crisis as narrative’ side 
of the question, then the policy response is exogenous and the timing endogenous. 
Some clever policy entrepreneur finally succeeded in convincing policymakers to 
accept her view of the situation and so convinced them that now is the time to act. 
In general terms, Colin Hay argues for the crisis-as-narrative view (Hay 1994, 1996, 
1999, 2001). Although he acknowledges that actual events may make it more likely 
for a crisis narrative to emerge, he regards material conditions as ‘at best a necessary 
but insufficient condition for such an intervention’ (Hay 2001: 203, emphasis in 
original). His stated objective is to force us to re-examine the importance of policy 
ideas and ideational contestation to the process of institutional change. In turn, this 
Decision-making and Policy Change 
                                                                                                                                       2 
should move us away from an historical institutionalist view of change that seems to 
imply that policy paradigms or ideologies are introduced instantaneously and fully-
formed (Hay 2001: 212-213). 
There is obvious merit to Hay’s general concern to underscore that ‘the 
institutionalization of a paradigm within the state apparatus and the translation of 
that paradigm into policy are protracted, unpredictable, and often contested 
processes’ (Hay 2001: 213). What is less obvious is how this justifies the elevation of 
narrative over material concerns. On the contrary, it is far easier to understand the 
protracted, unpredictable, and often contested process of policy development as part 
and parcel of the struggle to assert control over events in the material world.  
The struggle to master events in the real world is particularly obvious when looking 
at the financial crisis that has been unfolding since August 2007. There are many 
narratives that surround why this is happening but their influence on policy has 
been at best inconsistent. The narratives used by policymakers have been determined 
by events rather than the other way around. Consider Alan Greenspan’s testimony 
before the Congressional Committee on Government Oversight and Reform: 
It was the failure to properly price such risky assets that precipitated 
the crisis. In recent decades, a vast risk management and pricing 
system has evolved, combining the best theoretical insights of 
mathematicians and finance experts supported by major advances in 
computer and communications technology. A Nobel Prize was 
awarded for the discovery of the pricing model that underpins much of 
the advance in derivatives markets. This modern risk management 
paradigm held sway for decades. The whole intellectual edifice, 
however, collapsed in the summer of last year . . . (Greenspan 2008: 3). 
If we take Greenspan at his word, the crisis is material and not narrative – events 
have shaped the story rather than the other way around. Moreover, the distinction is 
non-trivial. Greenspan’s implied emphasis on the empirical basis of the current crisis 
is important for at least two reasons. First, it underscores the relationship between 
policy actions and real world outcomes. Politicians and policymakers can have 
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important normative debates about where the priorities for action should lie. But 
before they can go down that road (and even in the absence of political conflict) there 
is a real-world question to be answered about what will be the effect of a policy 
action – and, by extension, whether that effect will be sufficient in material terms to 
bring the crisis to an end. By placing too much emphasis on narrative over material 
conditions we run the risk of losing sight of the fact that policies should work – 
meaning have some material impact – and yet often do not. Even Nobel-prize 
winning stories about how markets function can suddenly come up short. 
The second reason for stressing material rather than narrative forces is to avoid the 
fallacies and anachronisms associated with what Herbert Butterfield (1931) has 
immortalized as The Whig Interpretation of History – reading the past in light of the 
present. For example, Hay takes the future of the past as given when he asserts that: 
Crisis can thus be seen as a process; a process in which the tendential 
unity of the state is discursively renegotiated and potentially (re-)-
achieved as a developmental trajectory is imposed upon the 
apparatuses and institutions which comprise it. Crisis is a process in 
which the site of political decision-making shifts from the 
disaggregated institutions, policy communities, networks and 
practices of the state apparatus to the state as a centralised and 
dynamic agent. The state is constituted anew through crisis (Hay 1999: 
338). 
It is hard to see how contemporary actors would recognize themselves in this process 
or whether they would agree with his characterization of its inner meaning. More 
likely, they would see themselves as struggling to keep their fingers in the dike while 
looking around to find something more permanent to plug the holes. As United 
States (U.S.) Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson (2008) put it when forced to explain 
his changing position on the use of funds under the Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(TARP): ‘We adjusted our strategy to reflect the facts of a severe market crisis, always 
keeping focused on our goal: to stabilize a financial system that is integral to the 
everyday lives of all Americans.’ Writing amidst a major crisis – when the past is the 
present, so to speak – it is easier to recognize how much the narrative of crisis, and 
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the authors of that narrative, are driven by events on the ground. 
This paper develops an argument about the material basis for the ongoing financial 
crisis in three sections. The first sets out different models for policy change and 
sketches a procedure for telling them apart. The second applies the procedure for 
choosing between the models using the information we have available about the 
ongoing financial crisis. The third section extends the argument to more general 
claims about the importance of experiential learning for the policy process. 
 
2. Characterizing Policy Change 
Like any analytic concept, it is possible to assign many specialized meanings to the 
word ‘crisis’. All such assignments have their uses, none constitutes the essential 
characteristic or ‘true’ meaning of the word. For my purposes, I adopt a common-use 
definition similar to the one provided by the Oxford English Dictionary and given at 
the outset of this paper. The crux lies in the notion that change is imminent. If things 
can continue as they are, there is no crisis. If they must change, there is. Of course 
since we have human agency involved, we could also add a layer of perception – 
meaning narrative, probability or intuition. If policymakers think, estimate, or 
believe that things cannot continue as they are, then there is a crisis. If they do not 
think, estimate, or believe that change is imminent, then there is not. 
That addition of human agency is where the problem begins. Once we start to define 
crisis in terms of thoughts, estimates, or beliefs, we expose ourselves to the central 
role of ideas. Human agents cannot think without ideas, they cannot estimate 
without models, and they cannot believe without conviction. On a basic level, we 
have to admit that ideas are central to human agency. If human agency is essential to 
our understanding of crisis then ideas – narratives, stories, what have you – are 
central to that understanding as well. 
This leaves us in a chicken-and-egg situation. Do we focus on the ideas and 
endogenize human agency or do we focus on our human agency and endogenize 
Erik Jones 
 
5                                                                                                                                       
ideas? Is the argument that any political leader would have responded in that 
fashion given the state of the art in policymaking at the time, the advice that was 
available, or the ideational entrepreneurs who dominated the scene? Or is the 
argument that these particular leaders were instrumental in promoting this specific 
policy response and without their presence the outcome would have been very 
different? 
The literature contains examples to suit any response. Although I doubt he would 
agree with my characterization of his work, Andrew Moravcsik’s (1998) Choice for 
Europe would set one end of the spectrum, where policymakers are bound to a course 
of action dictated by prevailing perceptions of the national interest. By contrast, 
Craig Parson’s (2003) A Certain Idea of Europe would lie at the other end of the 
spectrum, where policy makers are essentially ideational entrepreneurs. Kathleen 
McNamara’s (1998) Currency of Ideas fits somewhere in between the two; 
circumstances conspire to constrain the scope for policy alternatives, but there is still 
room for individual choice. 
The symmetry of this array is beguiling – not least because it omits the possibility 
that the material conditions underlying perceptions are actually running the show. 
Despite the weight of professional opinion, the lobbying of vested interests, the skill 
and access of ideational entrepreneurs, and the pre-commitments of the flesh-and-
blood agents in power, the policy adopted in a given context is determined by what 
actually works to change the otherwise unsustainable situation in the real world. 
Obviously, this possibility is fraught with difficulties. Someone has to recognize that 
the situation is unsustainable, someone has to propose the new policy, someone has 
to approve it, someone has to implement it, and someone has to assess (and accept) 
the results. Like it or not, there is bound to be a communication of ideas taking place. 
Nevertheless, it should be possible to distinguish between different causal 
trajectories where ideas have differing levels of importance. 
At this point it is useful to pull together assumptions into ideal types as a first step in 
the construction of characterizations for different patterns of crisis-response. Since 
the goal is to model policy change, the two questions to consider are: Is the stimulus 
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for action material or is it ideational? Is the response mechanical or is it deliberate? 
• Cybernetic – If the stimulus is material and the response is automatic, then 
the pattern for policy change is cybernetic and ideas are only important 
insofar as they relate to the design of the switching mechanism (Steinbruner 
1974). 
• Empirical – If the stimulus is material and the response is deliberate, then the 
pattern for policymaking is empirical. Policy change takes place because the 
automatic warning lights flashing in the real world indicate that something is 
wrong and it continues until the change in material conditions is such that 
those lights stop flashing. Here ideas are important in the design of the 
warning mechanism (as in the cybernetic model) and also in the efforts of 
policymakers to make sense of what is happening in the real world. This is 
the classical scientific world of Kuhn (1970) as described by Hall (1993). 
• Narrative – If the stimulus is ideational and the response is deliberate, then 
the pattern for policymaking is narrative in the sense that policy change is 
optional and takes place only once human agents are committed to a 
particular course of action. Moreover, policy change continues so long as the 
new course of action promises to address the reasons for change and to 
provide advantages over the plausible alternatives. Here ideas play a vital 
role in the commitment of human agents that change is necessary and that a 
particular course of action is the most desirable (Blyth 2001, 2002). 
• Ideological – If the stimulus is ideational and the response is automatic, then 
the pattern for policymaking is ideological (or tautological) in the same way 
that a computer program can simulate the behavior of complex systems 
according to predetermined rules. Here ideas permeate every aspect of the 
policymaking process because they constitute the socially constructed reality 
(or simulcra) within which policymaking takes place. In methodological 
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Figure 1: Four Models for Decision-making under Crisis 
 Response Mode  
    
Mechanical Rational 
 Material  Cybernetic  Empirical Cause or 
Stimulus 
 Ideological  Narrative 
The cybernetic and ideological models for policymaking are interesting, but less 
obviously relevant to the contemporary debate. We have seen cybernetic systems for 
economic policymaking in the past – as in the classical Gold Standard or the Bretton 
Woods System – but the cybernetic approach seems less applicable today. Indeed, 
what is striking about the present situation is the extent to which the policy 
apparatus has frozen up rather than swinging into action. The ideological model is 
also not relevant. Rigidly ideological communism has all but vanished, at least in the 
policy domain. As for ideological market liberalism, most observers agree that is 
now to a greater or lesser extent socially embedded (Ruggie 1982). Where it does 
exist, there is less reliance on market liberalism for policy guidance than there is 
conviction that something about market liberalism must have failed. Here again it is 
useful to cite Alan Greenspan’s recent testimony before the U.S. Congress: 
I made a mistake in presuming that the self-interest of organizations, 
specifically banks and others, were such is [sic] that they were best 
capable of protecting their own shareholders and their equity in firms . 
. . . So the problem here is something which looked to be a very solid 
edifice, and, indeed a critical pillar to market competition and free 
markets, did break down. And I think that, as I said, shocked me. I still 
do not fully understand why it happened and, obviously, to the extent 
that I figure out where it happened and why, I will change my views. If 
the facts change, I will change. (Hearings 2008: 34-35 [lines 768-772 
and 780-786]). 
We can set aside the cybernetic and ideological patterns in the current context, but 
that does not make it any easier to distinguish between the empirical and narrative 
alternatives. Both models involve choices made by sentient (or thinking) individuals 
who operate in some kind of institutional or social context. Ideas and human agency 
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are inseparable in this regard and so it is as likely that the facts changed and so 
Greenspan changed his mind, as it is that Greenspan changed his mind and so went 
out in search of different facts. Indeed, he may not have changed his mind as much 
as we might think (or he might suggest). Completing the sentence from the first 
Greenspan citation given above: 
The whole intellectual edifice, however, collapsed in the summer of 
last year because the data inputted into the risk management models 
generally covered only the past two decades, a period of euphoria. Had 
instead the models been fitted more appropriately to historic periods 
of stress, capital requirements would have been much higher and the 
financial world would be in far better shape today, in my judgment 
(Greenspan 2008: 4-5). 
  
3. Fitting the Evidence 
We need a testing strategy for recognizing meaningful distinctions between the 
different models. I propose to focus on four characteristics, each of which can assume 
one of two possible values. These characteristics relate to the nature of the triggering 
event, the timing of the response, the strategy for policy evaluation and the structure 
of any resulting evolution over time. Specifically, my interest is: 
• whether the trigger is objective or subjective – does the event require 
perception to have an impact?; 
• whether the response timing is automatic or deliberate – do policymakers 
have to decide on a response?; 
• whether the evaluation is end-based or rule based – do results matter more 
than process?; and, 
• whether the policy is adaptive or pre-determined – what is the balance 
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In focusing on these questions about characteristic features, my prior is that all of the 
patterns or models have elements in common but each is distinct in its combination 
of features. For example, the cybernetic and empirical models have objective triggers 
while the triggers for the narrative and ideological models are subjective. By contrast, 
where the response timing in the cybernetic and ideological models is automatic, the 
response timing in the empirical and narrative models is deliberate. Evaluation in the 
cybernetic and empirical models is based on outcomes; evaluation of the narrative 
and ideological models are based on adherence to process or rules. Finally, while 
policy evolution in the cybernetic and ideological models is strongly process-driven 
(and therefore predetermined or path dependent), the empirical and narrative 
models are adaptive and the solutions they offer can change significantly over time. 
 Figure 2: Four Characteristics for Decision-making Models 
 Models 
Characteristics 
Cybernetic Empirical Narrative Ideological 
Trigger 
(objective / subjective) Objective Objective Subjective Subjective 
Timing 













By organizing characteristics in this way, we can generate possible tests about how 
crisis-response models will manifest in terms of the historical record. For the present 
case, we should focus on those points of difference between the empirical and 
narrative models – the nature of the trigger and the basis for policy evaluation. Two 
questions are relevant: 
• Can we find evidence to suggest that something bad would have happened 
even if none of our policymakers recognized its significance? 
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• Do we have reason to believe that the situation could worsen no matter how 
confidently, convincingly, or consistently our politicians claim to have 
mastered events?  
The only way to answer these questions is to introduce some economic data and to 
connect that data to the record of events. 
 
3.1. The Trigger – Objective or Subjective? 
Most analysts agree that the root cause of the current financial crisis can be found in 
a combination of three factors.  
• The first factor was the large-scale creation (origination) of sub-prime and alt-
A mortgages in the United States that were in turn chopped up and 
repackaged in the form of collateralized debt obligations and other asset 
backed securities to be sold on to investors who were unconnected to the 
mortgage origination process, thus providing more cash for new mortgages. 
• The second factor was the inappropriate risk-rating of these mortgage backed 
securities and the growing availability of over-the-counter quasi-insurance 
cover against default risk in the form of credit default swaps. The poorly 
rated securities looked like good deals for large investors with access to cheap 
credit and the ready availability of credit default swap protection made it 
more attractive for banks to provide cheap credit to large investors. 
• The third factor behind the financial crisis was the fact that the compensation 
schemes used across the industry – from the bounties given to mortgage 
brokers, to the haircuts earned by the people who repackaged the mortgages 
into securities, to the fees charged by rating agencies and asset portfolio 
managers, to the bonuses paid to bank executives – created perverse 
incentives for each of these different sets of actors to disregard or downplay 
the risks they faced. Meanwhile, the risks continued to mount as more sub-
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prime and alt-A mortgages were originated and pushed into the wider 
financial system. 
Borrowing again from Hay, this was a heavy ‘weight of contradictions’. It was not, 
however, a crisis. The crisis came when people started to default on their mortgages. 
These defaults were most evident in the sub-prime category as a percentage of value. 
But they were also important among alt-A and prime mortgages, which were less 
likely to go under in percentage terms but which were much larger in terms of 
absolute values (IMF 2008: 12). 
This rise in defaults across all mortgage types presented a number of different 
problems given each of the three factors listed above. 
• First, as mortgage defaults and delinquencies start to rise, this put downward 
pressure on house prices – because repossessed homes sell at a deep discount 
and because homeowners who default on their mortgages drop out of the 
housing market. The effect tended to be localized. It was nevertheless 
important because the distribution of sub-prime mortgages was localized as 
well. As a general rule, sub-prime mortgage lending concentrates either in 
areas where household incomes are universally low (which makes sub-prime 
mortgages the only route to home-ownership) or in areas where house prices 
rise quickly enough that the appreciation in nominal home values makes the 
high cost of borrowing at sub-prime seem worthwhile. When house prices 
start to fall in those areas where mortgages are most risky, homeowners who 
are already stretched financially face the prospect that they will not be able to 
refinance their mortgages or sell out without finding themselves with 
negative equity, meaning they would owe money to the bank at the end of 
the process. Hence they become more likely to default as well. 
• Second, the rise in mortgage delinquencies and defaults cut into the value of 
the mortgage backed securities and so their prices fell. This happened initially 
in those securities that were most dependent upon sub-prime mortgages and 
then spread to other instruments (IMF 2008: 13). In turn, investors who held 
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those securities found themselves short of collateral relative to the loans they 
had taken out to buy them in the first place and so faced bank-initiated 
margin calls. This forced them to sell some or all of their investments in a 
declining market, further pushing down prices – not just for mortgage backed 
securities but for other financial instruments as well. 
• Third, the combination of mortgage write-downs and margin calls began to 
put downward pressure on market prices across the board. Shares in financial 
industries were particularly vulnerable. To begin with, these industries were 
themselves large investors and so faced direct losses related to the decline in 
value of mortgage backed securities. Even if they were not directly exposed, 
they were indirectly vulnerable because they were the ones who made the 
loans – either to large investors who were taking direct losses or to other 
financial firms that were losing directly, indirectly, or both. Finally, financial 
firms were the ones who held most of the instruments used to swap 
protection against credit default. As the crisis worsened, these instruments 
not only lost value but also made the firms liable to pay default protection, 
given up their own cash to cover the loses incurred by someone else. 
The crisis emerged when all these forces combined to cause a seizure in the interbank 
lending market in August 2007 (IMF 2008: 3, 78). As a result, the cost of borrowing on 
the interbank market suddenly shot up and the possibility of borrowing in any 
quantity was not guaranteed. Indeed, many banks simply stopped lending to some 
other banks altogether. This played havoc with those banks that depended upon the 
interbank market to meet their day-to-day liquidity requirements – like the British 
regional bank, Northern Rock. Once it became known that the Northern Rock would 
have to depend upon the Bank of England for its liquidity, depositors queued up to 
withdraw their funds and the government had no choice but to step in. 
From this description, it is hard to come to the conclusion that the financial crisis is 
more about perceptions (and narratives) than reality – at least insofar as the 
perceptions of policymakers are concerned. Market perceptions may be a different 
matter. To be sure, banks stopped lending to one another for a reason. Depositors 
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staged a run on the Northern Rock for a reason as well. Ideas about solvency and loss 
clearly played a role in the sudden tightening of the interbank lending market. But 
these ideas had less to do with any deep understanding of the crisis than with the 
fear that events were moving outside understanding altogether. The freeze in 
interbank lending had less to do with credit constraints (the lack of money in the 
system) than with counter-party risk (the fear that you would not get your money 
back). Banks simply did not know what was on the balance sheets of potential 
borrowers and so could not assess their creditworthiness. Rather than gamble on the 
outcome, they choose to hold onto their cash. 
The August/September 2007 crisis was a classic moment of Knightian uncertainty – 
where probabilities could not be calculated because the data did not fit with the 
available models (Knight 1964). This uncertainty was not read into the situation. It 
emerged from the confluence of material forces at play. The crisis was not part of a 
narrative. As the Greenspan quote above suggests, the crisis came when the narrative 
broke down. 
 
3.2. Evaluation – End-based or Rule-based? 
At this point it is reasonable to agree with writers like Blyth (2002: 35-37) that only 
ideas can lead you out of a situation of Knightian uncertainty. If you do not have any 
idea what is happening and someone tells you to do something, your first 
consideration would be ‘why?’. But that would be the case under any circumstance. 
Purposive action requires a purpose and – to be meaningful – that purpose has to be 
understood. The more interesting question concerns how long the link between 
action and purpose can be maintained. Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice, 
and you have to consider why I am so easily fooled. 
Blyth (2002: 34-44) has a five-part theory for how the link between purpose and 
action can be maintained. First, ideas help to create certainty in crisis – they tell you 
what to do when the old formulas for policymaking no longer seem to apply. 
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Second, these same ideas become the focal points for collective action by helping 
individuals to understand their role in any division of labor as well as their stake in 
the final outcome. Third, these ideas go on to provide a blueprint for the 
transformation of the prevailing (or pre-existing) institutional environment, telling 
actors how to make existing endowments conform to new circumstances. Fourth, 
ideas stimulate the creation of institutional arrangements that are entirely innovative. 
Finally, ideas can ensure that interests and expectations conform to the new (and 
newly reformed) institutional framework. 
There are two ways to read Blyth’s argument – one trivial, the other novel. The trivial 
reading is as a description of human agency at work. If humans can only act 
purposively with some idea in mind, then Blyth’s framework is just a litany of the 
different types or manifestations of human action. The novel interpretation is that 
Blyth reveals the extent to which human agency is guided by ideas – ideas which 
possess autonomous causal significance insofar as they not only tell us what to do, 
but why it is in our interests to do so and, indeed, what those interests are in the first 
place. Here it is useful to quote at length from another of Blyth’s works on the 
subject: 
Such ideas [‘causal stories’ about the economy that provide agents 
with an interpretive framework within which they can define, 
diagnose, and explain a crisis as an event which necessitates a 
particular set of actions] do more than alter preferences; they 
reconstitute agents’ interests by providing alternative frameworks 
through which uncertain situations, and the place of agents within 
them, can be understood. . . . By defining how the economy works, and 
the place of the individual within the economy, crisis-defining ideas 
both diagnose the disjuncture and in doing so set limits upon the 
institutional form that will supposedly solve it (Blyth 2007: 762, 
emphasis in original). 
For this novel interpretation to make sense, the essential benchmark for evaluating 
the causal chain effected through human agency has to be ‘the idea’ itself, no matter 
how complicated or contested that idea may be. The certainty traces back to the idea. 
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So do the collective action, role conceptualization, and even perception of self-
interest. Existing institutions must adapt to the idea and new institutions must 
emerge from it. Finally, any stability must derive from the interaction of idea, 
certainty, action, concept, perception, and institutions taken as a whole. Moreover, it 
is not just economic or institutional stability that is at stake here; social legitimacy 
depends upon the resonance of the idea with popular understanding as well 
(Seabrooke 2007). The idea cannot be ‘wrong’ in any absolute or material sense; it can 
only be weak as a framework for problem recognition, collective action, and 
subsequent institutionalization. Political might makes the idea ‘right’. 
The self-referential character of ideas in this interpretation of Blyth is novel in the 
sense that it departs from how we usually understand human agency – because the 
solutions define the people and the problem, rather than the other way around. 
Indeed, it is hard to imagine that policymakers would recognize themselves in the 
process or even that they would self-consciously embrace ideational consistency as 
the most useful frame of reference for evaluating policy choices. This leaves two 
possibilities. One is that policymakers are unaware of the guiding influence of ideas, 
much as Keynes complained at the end of his General Theory. In this case, ideational 
consistency should reveal itself in the pattern of policy action. The other possibility is 
that ideational consistency never reveals itself because policymakers jump from one 
set of ideas to another. Policymaking stops following a narrative pattern and 
becomes an empirical concern. To illustrate this point it is useful to consider ongoing 
debates about a range of different policy instruments: collateral rules for central bank 
credit, government-sponsored bailouts for the financial industry, and deposit 
insurance for commercial banks and money market accounts. In each case, ideational 
consistency gives way to events on the ground. 
The debate about collateral rules dates back to the Northern Rock crisis. The 
Northern Rock required special liquidity from the Bank of England for two reasons. 
The first was that it could not get sufficient liquidity from the interbank market. The 
second was that it did not have adequate collateral to borrow from the Bank of 
England under the existing rules for central bank lending. Prior to the crisis, the Bank 
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of England would not accept mortgages (or mortgage-backed securities) as collateral 
for central bank lending because it did not want the risk that such instruments 
implied on its books. By contrast, the European Central Bank (ECB) had looser 
collateral rules and so – given enough time to organize the paperwork through its 
Irish subsidiaries – the Northern Rock could have gotten liquidity there. The time 
simply did not exist and so the chairman of the Northern Rock went to the Bank of 
England for exceptional support. Once the Bank of England made that known, the 
Northern Rock’s fate was sealed. 
With the collapse of the Northern Rock, the Bank of England changed its collateral 
rules to accept mortgages and related instruments. This brought it more in line with 
ECB practice. That does not mean, however, that the debate over collateral rules was 
settled. On the contrary, the ECB began to notice that market participants were 
(potentially) taking advantage of its willingness to accept relatively risky assets. 
During the summer of 2008, the ECB worked to tighten its collateral rules to prevent 
such abuse. This tightening was announced on 4 September 2008, just days before the 
U.S. Treasury allowed Lehman Brothers to collapse. As interbank lending seized up 
again, the ECB had to put its changes into reverse. The U.S. Federal Reserve loosened 
its collateral rules as well. 
The Lehman Brothers story underscores the confusion about bank bailouts and 
defaults. In March 2008, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York opened a special 
lending facility for the investment bank Bear Stearns and then orchestrated a private 
sector buyout of Bear Stearns by J.P. Morgan Chase. These actions were intended to 
shield the market from the consequences of a Bear Stearns collapse. The problem was 
that they were widely interpreted as nurturing moral hazard. Therefore when 
another investment bank, Lehman Brothers, threatened to become insolvent in 
September 2008, U.S. Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson declined to intervene. Instead 
he tried to orchestrate a wholly private sector solution and when that failed he 
pivoted in order to prepare the markets for Lehman’s inevitable demise. 
The consequences of Lehman’s default were much greater than foreseen. Although 
Paulson may have thought he could prepare the markets, he underestimated the 
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challenge that such preparation implied. Not only was Lehman an important 
counter-party in a number of relationships ranging in terms of complexity from 
interbank lending to complex over-the-counter derivatives contracts, but it was also 
subject to a huge volume of credit default protection. Far from acting as a brake on 
moral hazard, the Lehman default revealed the uncertainty surrounding how big a 
bank has to be in order to be too big to fail. When Lehman’s credit instruments went 
to auction on 10 October 2008 – a key step in the settlement of credit default swap 
contracts – the New York Stock Exchange went into a rout. In the aftermath, few 
policymakers were eager to experiment with another banking collapse. 
The remaining illustrations all concern near-misses or policy flips. The extension of 
deposit insurance to commercial banks and money market accounts illustrates both 
points. The money market accounts were a near miss. The U.S. Treasury hoped to 
stop depositors from fleeing their existing money market funds by offering to 
guarantee them for up to a year. What they did not take into account was that this 
would make money market funds just as safe as regular deposits, despite the fact 
that money market accounts pay a higher rate of return. Although it would secure 
money market accounts, the effect might be to trigger a run on regular deposits. The 
American Bankers Association intervened and the Treasury included a restriction 
that it would cover only pre-existing accounts in its policy announcement. 
The policy flip comes not from the United States but from Ireland, Britain and 
Germany. On Tuesday, 30 September 2008, the Irish government announced that it 
would guarantee all deposits in Irish banks. This action drew fire from the British 
Prime Minister and the German Chancellor. Despite their opposition, however, first 
one then the other had to increase deposit protection in order to offset the flow of 
funds from their own institutions into Irish banks and to stave off the prospect of a 
bank panic at home. 
It would be possible to extend this list of illustrations to include central bank term-
specific liquidity injections, interest rate reductions, bank recapitalization, fiscal 
stimulus, and a host of other policy instruments. The common theme is 
experimentation. Not everything works; nothing so far has worked for good. 
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Meanwhile, the economic situation continues to worsen as financial turmoil has 
undermined real economic performance. Whether we recognized it or not, the 
August 2007 financial crisis constituted an initial turning point. Failure to respond 
adequately led to further crises in March and September of 2008. By that time what 
started as a financial crisis transformed into a crisis of the real economy as well. If we 
evaluate what has happened so far in material terms, we have to regret that the 
situation is not better (even if we find comfort in the possibility that it could also be 
worse). That seems to be what policymakers are saying. They do not have a narrative 
or a bold idea to get us out of this mess. But they remain determined to do whatever 
they can until they find something that works. 
 
4. From Bad to Worse 
The shift from financial crisis to a crisis of the real economy was only a single step in 
a longer chain. At each stage, policymakers have found themselves at a turning point 
at which the current situation is unsustainable and a failure to act is likely to make 
matters worse. The point to note, however, is that this worsening of the crisis is not a 
narrative condition – instead it plays out in the material conditions of the real world. 
To illustrate this point, I focus on three sets of variables: stock market indexes, long-
term sovereign debt yields, and exchange rates. In all three cases, the point I want to 
make is the same. Since the deepening of the crisis in the Autumn of 2008, conditions 
in the real economy have infected performance at the international level. As a result, 
countries that were not exposed to sub-prime lending have seen their markets jolted; 
investment instruments that operate outside the interbank lending market have seen 
their yields diverge; and exchange rates between the major currencies have shifted 
dramatically. Of course each of these events can be traced back to the perceptions of 
market makers – although how consistently or convincingly is a very different 
concern. The point is that none of these events can be connected to the perceptions of 
policymakers (at least not ex ante) and yet each is important to how policymakers 
ultimately will respond. 
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The first illustration concerns the stock market performance in Brazil, Russia, India, 
and China – known collectively as the BRICs – as compared to the United States. 
These countries are not closely tied to the securitization markets that have been at the 
root of the financial problem in the United States and Europe. Nevertheless, they are 
tied through exports to the real performance of the advanced economies. As that 
performance has deteriorated, the stock markets of these emerging economies have 
collapsed – in some cases losing more than three-quarters of their market 
capitalization. This can be seen in Figure 3, which provides comparable indexes for 
stock market performance in each of the BRICs that are normalized by setting the 
average for 2002 equal to 100. As these markets have lost value, this has not only 
wiped out the investments of a large number of actors in the development world, but 
it has also exposed investors from Europe and the United States to major loses both 
directly, where they invested in the market, and indirectly, were they provided loans 
for local investors to buy stocks on the margin. 
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The second illustration concerns the yield spreads on long-term sovereign debt 
issues among highly indebted countries within the eurozone. As governments across 
Europe attempted to respond to the sudden economic downturn, they confronted a 
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bond market still confused by the global financial crisis. Within this market, some 
sovereign debt instruments – like those belonging to Germany – are suddenly very 
attractive while others – like Ireland or Greece – are the subject of intense 
speculation. The concern has centred on whether a sovereign state in the eurozone 
could actually default on its public debt. And while the probability of such an event 
is low, the pricing implications in the bond market have been significant. Where 10-
year long bonds used to with differences of less than one-half of one percent, 
suddenly that spread increased by more than a factor of five. This can be seen in 
Figure 4. 
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The third illustration points to the movement of the dollar, yen, and pound against 
the euro. Exchange rates between the dollar and the euro have long-since departed 
from anything resembling purchasing power parity and the peak-to-trough 
movements in that relationship are impossible to explain using macroeconomic 
‘fundamentals’. Even so, nothing in the first decade of the eurozone can compare to 
the wild volatility that erupted during the global financial crisis. Not only did the 
euro and the dollar move sharply against one-another, but the pound-euro and yen-
euro exchange rates deviated sharply as well. Explanations for these movements 
range from portfolio consolidation to an unwinding of the global carry trade. 
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Whatever the cause, however, it is hard to imagine that anyone anticipated these 
movements before the fact; and it is easy to suggest that policymakers as yet have no 
idea how best to respond. This exchange rate volatility can be seen in Figure 5. 



































































































































This high degree of exchange-rate volatility has a significant impact not only across 
bilateral currency relationships but across the ensemble of global currency and 
commodity markets taken as a as a whole. Once again policymakers face a bout of 
uncertainty. The situation cannot continue as it is. The question is how they should 
respond. So far their efforts have been ineffective. Increasingly, their people have 
begun to vent their frustration. The international phase of the crisis is only its most 
recent manifestation. A political phase may be the next in the round. 
 
5. What Does It Mean? 
If we were going to characterize the pattern of policymaking in the present crisis, the 
best fit would be that it is empirical rather than narrative. Although real human 
beings are deliberating about how best to respond and (hopefully) drawing upon the 
best ideas that the policy and academic communities have to offer, the underlying 
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reality is that the problem they face is a material one and the standards for 
evaluating policy performance are material as well. Moreover, I think policymakers 
would easily identify with this characterization. 
For social scientists, the implications are more difficult to accept. They not only need 
to understand how the policy apparatus operates in generating a response to the 
crisis, but they also need to know how the resulting policies are supposed to work 
and actually work as well. This means they need to take ideas seriously – not just as 
the source of policy, but also as the product of interaction between policymakers, 
policy analysts, academics, and the material world. 
Of course life would be easier if social scientists only had to take the first element 
into account. If they could take ideas as exogenous, independent variables, then all 
they would need to do is show how these ideas penetrate into the political system. 
Much of the criticism directed at the ‘Washington Consensus’ in international 
development seems to go down this route, as does criticism of international 
responses to the Asian financial crisis. Consider, for example, the contrast between 
Hall (2003) and Liao (2001). 
If ideas really matter, though, they should be treated with greater respect. The 
burden of proof for those who wish to cast ideas as exogenous variables should be to 
demonstrate a persistent disconnect from the underlying material reality. This is not 
an insurmountable obstacle and Blyth (2002), for example, moves at least part way in 
the right direction. The key is that the tests should be made more explicit. Those who 
would advocate the causal significance of ideas should claim that material forces 
were not the trigger for a given crisis only if they can demonstrate their insufficiency. 
Equally, they should be able to demonstrate that material effects do not form an 
integral part of policy evaluation as well. No-one is denying that politicians are 
capable of narrating us into crisis. But that is not the same as saying all crisis is 
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